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Resistance strategies through the CEO communications in the media 
 
 
Abstract - This study analyses the strategic responses to institutional pressures through 
organisational discursive practices. This analysis is developed through an interpretive case 
study of EDP, the largest Portuguese group in the electricity sector. Our empirical material 
includes CEO communications in the media from 2010 to 2014, and is interpreted through a 
theoretical framework derived from institutional theory, developed by complementing Oliver’s 
(1991) strategic responses to institutional pressures with the verbal accounts as defined by 
Elsbach (1994). The study highlights the country-level institutional structures, the 
organisations’ own characteristics and the power of the constituents involved in the process as 
important predictors of responses in a complex environment. EDP strategically resisted 
institutional pressures as it negotiated among competing forces of institutional control, delaying 
partial compliance to coercive pressures and using time as a resource for organisation actions. 
EDP’s strategies reinforce the argument that organisations may consider unconditional 
compliance with broader stakeholder interests unacceptable when the profit logic is called into 
question before the dominance of the neo-liberal capitalist ideology. We have rendered visible 
the consequences of the project of neoliberalisation and the agenda of state privatisation of the 
European Union, resulting in a simple redistribution of resources towards shareholders and 
investors, to the disadvantage of other groups in society. 
 







The neoliberal ideology that pervades westerns economies was responsible for two 
major waves of reforms: privatisation/deregulation initiatives and new public management 
(Morales, Gendron, & Guénin-Paracini, 2014). More specifically, “Neo-liberal mentalities have 
led to profound change within accounting, management, and society, towards business and 
investing, resulting in the dominance of shareholder value” (Stein, 2008, p. 1011; see also 
Alawattage & Alsaid, 2018). This ideology had repercussions in the energy sector, which has 
been a stage for profound institutional change in Europe. In addition to institutional pressures 
that affect most organisations, electricity utilities are subject to specific pressures (Cooper, 
2003; Hooks, Coy, & Davey, 2002). The need for regulation and its importance to society means 
that “it is a politically sensitive industry and therefore one in which government will have an 
interest” (Cooper, 2003, p. 235). The cost of electricity affects the whole economy and society 
and can interfere with the level of competitiveness and throw families into situations of energy 
poverty.  
This study aims to analyse the strategic responses to institutional pressures through 
organisational discursive practices. This objective is operationalised with the development of a 
contextualised, detailed and in-depth analysis of EDP’s strategic responses through its CEO 
communications in the media, during the period of 2010-2014, against a background of high 
institutional pressures and expectations. According to institutional theorists, organisations and 
particularly those providing a public service (“utilities”) are subject to significant technical and 
institutional pressures that shape organisations and organisational practices (Scott & Meyer, 
1991). EDP is the largest business group operating in the electricity sector in Portugal, supplies 
an essential public service, operates in an environmentally sensitive sector, and is constantly 
exposed to ethical, political, economic and social issues.  
We build our argument on a theoretical framework derived from institutional theory, 
developed by complementing Oliver’s (1991) strategic responses to institutional pressures with 
the verbal accounts as defined by Elsbach (1994). CEO discourse was used as a symbolic 
management tool that intended to influence the “meaning of acts” to conform with the social 
values and expectations of the different actors in the complex institutional environment. 
Literature suggests that organisations are not just passively constrained by external 
pressures and expectations. They have interests, capacities and power that influence their 
choices. Consciously and strategically organisations attempt to promote their interests and to 
influence stakeholders’ perceptions, adopting a variety of strategic responses aimed at 
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withstanding threats to their survival and legitimacy (Canning & O’Dwyer 2013; Dhalla & 
Oliver, 2013; Elsbach, 1994; Oliver, 1991; Raaijmakers,Vermeulen, Meeus, & Zietsma, 2015). 
To appear legitimate is an important means of protecting key resources.  
Deephouse, Bundy, Tost, and Suchman (2017, p. 32) defined legitimacy as “the 
perceived appropriateness of an organization to a social system in terms of rules, values, norms, 
and definitions”. While organisations attempt to obtain stability and legitimacy (DiMaggio, 
1988; Oliver, 1991), the importance of legitimacy for organisations is more obvious in times of 
crisis or controversy when legitimacy is debated (Deephouse et al., 2017, p. 33, emphasis in 
the original). Because legitimacy affects organisational performance and survival, organisations 
have an incentive to respond to challenges to their legitimacy (Deephouse et al., 2017; 
Suchman, 1995). The meaning of organisational actions is interpreted and pronounced to a great 
extent by top management (Ginzel, Kramer, & Sutton, 2004). Based on Goffman, Mueller 
(2017, p.12, emphasis in the original) argued that “reality is not only socially constructed but is 
constructed in and through performances …[and] talking is an essential part of the 
performance”. The CEO has, therefore, “a degree of power to define social reality for many 
corporate stakeholders” (Amernic, Craig, & Tourish, 2010, p.28). In many companies, as 
argued by Craig and Brennan (2012, p.171, emphasis in the original; see also Amernic et al., 
2010), “THE CEO IS THE COMPANY”. Accordingly, the words of powerful CEOs represent 
an asset (Amernic & Craig, 2017). 
Our empirical material includes CEO communications in the media from 2010 to 2014. 
Literature highlights that CEO discourse has enormous power to frame organisational reality 
and influence constituents (Amernic et al., 2010). Speeches, press releases, interviews and 
narrative parts of annual reports, or meetings and corridor conversations are a “set of complex 
communicative acts with symbolic, emotional, cultural and political overtone” with “an 
inherently strategic form of ‘sense-making’” (Amernic et al., 2010, p. 25). The CEO uses 
discourse strategically for symbolic management of organisational activities and practices 
(Craig & Brennan, 2012; Hambrick & Lovelace, 2018; Mäkelä & Laine, 2011). Accounting is, 
in this vein, an available rhetorical device (Covaleski, Dirsmith, & Samuel, 1995) to legitimise 
and promulgate the status quo (Hopper & Powell, 1985).  
The literature has provided insights about the role of the CEO’s formal and informal 
discourse in the construction of legitimacy (e.g., Amernic & Craig, 2017; Amernic et al., 2010; 
Beelitz & Merkl-Davies, 2012; Gendron & Breton, 2013). By directly interacting with 
organisational audiences, particularly the media, and by means of press conferences and 
interviews (Beelitz & Merkl-Davies, 2012), the CEO is the social face of the company. In 
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particular, the media is an often used tool to address issues of public interest and it acts as a 
social arbiter influencing stakeholders’ expectations about organisations and their leaders 
(Bednar, Boivie, & Prince, 2013). Organisations often provide a public response through the 
media in an attempt to influence external perceptions about the appropriateness of 
organisations’ activities in a context of institutional complexity (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; She 
& Michelon, 2019; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012; see also Rindova, Pollock, & 
Hayward, 2006). 
This paper contributes to accounting research on corporate communication by enriching 
literature that examines organisational response through discourses to multiple constituents 
under circumstances of institutional complexity (Bertels & Lawrence, 2016; Raaijmakers et al., 
2015; Vermeulen, Zietsma, Greenwood, & Langley, 2016) and in extending the authorship and 
forms of accounts beyond annual reports (Merkl-Davis & Brennan, 2017; Nègre, Verdier, Cho, 
& Patten, 2017; Tregidga, Milne, & Lehman, 2012). By using the insights from interpretive and 
qualitative methodologies, this paper contributes to improving our understanding of corporate 
communication through the messages of CEOs in the media and their roles in accountability 
processes. In addition, it extends institutional theorisations in accounting, illustrating how the 
integration of Oliver’s (1991) strategic responses to institutional pressures, the verbal accounts 
as defined by Elsbach (1994) and institutional concepts of power and interest contribute to our 
better understanding of the process of the symbolic management of organisational legitimacy. 
Finally, the study contributes to critical accounting research on corporate communication by 
highlighting how corporates’ distinctive institutional traits enable organisations to engage in 
self-interested behaviour, creating particular understandings that reinforce the dominance of 
capitalist/neoliberal logic. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: the second section develops the 
theoretical framework that guided the analysis of research. The third section presents EDP, the 
case study chosen for this research, devoting particular attention to António Mexia, the CEO of 
EDP during the period of analysis. The fourth section presents the research method applied in 
order to address the aim of the paper. The fifth section describes the institutional environment 
and the controversy surrounding EDP on the issue of electricity bills and excessive rents. The 
following section examines the CEO’s communications in the media from 2010 to 2014, in 
response to challenges to institutional pressures. Finally, the last section discusses the findings 





2. Theoretical issues  
Institutional theorists have contributed significantly to a better understanding of the 
relationship between organisational structures and practices and the wider social environment 
in which organisations are located (Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004). Within the neo-
institutional framework, organisations are open systems that operate and are embedded in a 
social framework of institutional rules, norms, values and beliefs that shape their behaviours 
(Scott, 1987, 2001; Scott & Meyer, 1994) and with which they need to conform to legitimise 
their existence (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Organisational action 
within any institutional order is therefore guided by broader cultural templates, the “institutional 
logics” that provide organisational actors with means-ends designations, as well as organising 
principles (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2017).  
Single or multiple logics pervade organisations (e.g., Dalpiaz, Rindova, & Ravasi, 2016; 
Pache & Santos, 2013) through external actors including professional organisations, regulatory 
bodies, or funding agencies, or through internal actors (staff members, executives, board 
members) that define the appropriate “practices, norms, and values that they have been trained 
to follow or have been socialized into” (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 459). The compliance with 
institutional rules is due therefore, not only to internal factors (efficiency and cost-minimising 
objectives) but also to external factors, such as access to resources, political power, societal 
fitness or even organisational survival.  
Compliance with institutional demands is, however, particularly difficult, especially in 
cases of institutional complexity, where organisations depend on and are expected to respond 
to multiple and sometimes conflicting requirements from uncoordinated actors (Greenwood, 
Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2017; Vermeulen et al., 
2016). Developments in institutional theory suggest that organisational fields are increasingly 
heterogeneous and that organisations are not unitary actors that make univocal decisions but 
pluralistic, complex entities composed of various groups with different values, goals and 
interests that may respond differently to heterogeneity (Dalpiaz et al., 2016; Greenwood et al., 
2011). The basis of the power of a group is its claim over resources and rules (Lawrence & 
Buchanan, 2017). The incumbent groups try to preserve the status quo or to reinforce their 
power (Fligstein, 1997). Institutional change is therefore “a political process that reflects the 
power and interests of organized actors” (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004, p.658; see also 
Dillard et al., 2004). 
When confronted with multiple or competing logics, organisations may be required to 
combine, ignore or defy some of them (Pache & Santos, 2010, 2013). In those cases, 
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organisations can develop strategic and heterogeneous responses in order to resolve institutional 
complexity and securing legitimacy while assuring organisational performance and survival 
(Bertels & Lawrence, 2016; Pache & Santos, 2013; Vermeulen et al., 2016). As pointed by 
Tilcsik (2010, p. 1493), “over time, an organisation may adopt several different responses to 
the same institutional mandate”. In this respect, Raaijmakers et al. (2015) argued that the path 
to legitimacy is uncertain, even in the case of coercive pressures, and decision makers may take 
time to respond to the institutional mandate. To better understand how organisational legitimacy 
is managed by organisations in a complex institutional environment, Figure 1 provides a 
theoretical framework to explain organisational strategic responses to institutional pressures. 
 
[insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Despite the new array of literature that explores how organisations respond to 
institutional complexity, Oliver’s (1991) seminal work already suggested that organisations 
could respond strategically to institutional pressures. The choice of the organisational strategy 
will depend on the type of pressures as well as why, how, where, and through whom they occur. 
In helping to provide an answer to these questions, Oliver (1991, p.159) defined five 
institutional antecedents – cause, constituents, content, control, and context – that predict the 
occurrence of alternative strategies that can vary from passive conformity to active resistance. 
Therefore, in order of increasing active resistance, five types of strategic responses were 
developed: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation (Oliver, 1991) 
(see Appendix 1 for strategies and tactics description). In this study we analyse the strategic 
responses to institutional pressures, following the typology defined by Oliver (1991), through 
the discursive practices that constitute them, by means of the use of verbal accounts as defined 
by Elsbach (1994). 
Because discourse can add to the understanding of institutional practices, we extend 
institutional theorizing by linking Oliver’s strategic responses to Elsbach’s (1994) model of 
symbolic management of organisational legitimacy. Discourses are structured collections of 
significant texts that do not just describe reality but construct reality (Parker, 2014). But not all 
actions and texts matter1. It is only when texts are read and used by others that they have 
organising properties and the potential to influence discourse. Actions that are more likely to 
generate texts that leave traces are the ones that are novel and the ones that affect organisational 
                                                 
1 In this meaning, texts that make up discourses can have different formats: they can be written, but also spoken 
or represented in some other way (e.g. pictures, symbols) (Taylor & Van Every, 1993). 
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legitimacy (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004). Actions to pursue legitimacy are likely to 
produce written, verbal or other symbolic texts to establish, signal or change organisational 
legitimacy. Elsbach is among the theorists that asserts that the management of legitimacy 
depends on organisational communication (Elsbach, 1994). Drawing on insights from 
institutional theory and impression management, Elsbach (1994) developed a model that 
describes the management of organisational legitimacy from a symbolic perspective. As 
presented in Figure 1, this model combines two broad forms of verbal accounts with two broad 
types of contents – accounts may be defined by both their form (i.e. how they are framed) and 
their content (i.e. how they are built) – and characterises how both the forms and contents affect 
perceptions of organisational legitimacy.  
The two broad forms of accounts include denials and acknowledgments (Elsbach, 1994). 
Denials are symbolic responses (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990) signifying a dismissal of the claim 
that a problem exists, or has existed, with organisational actions (Elsbach, 1994; Lamin & 
Zaheer, 2012). Elsbach (1994, p.65) recognises that organisational spokespersons frequently 
give “emotionally charged denials as their initial response to controversial events”. These 
denials comprise the different strategic responses developed by Oliver (1991), with the 
exception of acquiescence, which assumes the form of acknowledgment. On the other hand, 
acknowledgments consist in claiming that: “a negative event occurred, but ...”, “it wasn’t our 
fault” or “we had a good reason for our actions” or “the ultimate outcome was positive” 
(Elsbach, 1994, p.65). Acknowledgments have the advantage of improving organisational 
actors’ credibility (Sutton & Callahan, 1987). The two types of account content refer to 
technical or institutional features of organisations (Elsbach, 1994). Technical features are 
related to organisational efficiency and effectiveness issues (Scott, 1995). On the other hand, 
the institutional features consist of normative and socially endorsed organisational practices 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1977).  
The effectiveness of accounts is explained by the audience’s perceptions of the type and 
seriousness of a controversy, their expertise regarding the issue and their expectations regarding 
organisational responses (Elsbach, 1994). The author suggests that verbal accounts combining 
acknowledgments with references to widely institutionalised features are the most effective in 
protecting organisational legitimacy. Denial response is suggestive of intransigence and can 
undermine public trust in the organisation (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012). 
As a matter of fact, this strategy stigmatises organisations in the public perception, negatively 
affecting their legitimacy (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Elsbach, 1994; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012). 
Verbal accounts that refer to technical features may be also ineffective in protecting 
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organizational legitimacy (Elsbach, 1994). Constituents may perceive technical accounts as 
“self-serving rhetoric that puts industry interests ahead of the welfare of the public”, or as 
insufficient explanations for organisational actions (Elsbach, 1994, p.75). The verbal accounts 
provided by individual actors – how they are framed and how they are built – will influence 
stakeholders’ perceptions, and consequently institutional pressures. In turn, power and interests 
of different actors condition both the institutional pressures and the verbal accounts over time. 
This supports the study of legitimacy as “a continually unfolding process in which different 
scenarios can be identified at different points in time” (Deephouse et al., 2017, p.4), as 
represented by the arrow in Figure 1.For empirical support, we apply the framework, as 
systematised in Figure 1, to analyse the organisational strategic responses to institutional 
pressures. 
We extend institutional theorizing by linking Oliver’s strategic responses to institutional 
pressures with Elsbach’s verbal accounts to symbolically manage organisational legitimacy. 
Organisations are nested in a complex institutional environment. The path to legitimacy is not 
a straightforward one, and organisations, based on their institutional antecedents, respond 
strategically to institutional pressures, as proposed by Oliver (1991). Therefore, it is important 
to pursue a deeper understanding of how particular organisations engage in different response 
patterns over time (Greenwood, Oliver, Lawrence, & Meyer, 2017). Similarly to Albu, Albu 
and Alexander (2014), we do not test those antecedents, but we use them as theoretical lenses 
in order to better understand our empirical findings. By focusing on institutional and technical 
characteristics of organisations that might serve as the content of accounts in response to 
legitimacy threats, Elsbach’s (1994) model enriches Oliver’s (1991) model of strategic 
responses.  
Organisational response is visualised through discourses, be they written, spoken or 
represented in some other way, other than actions per se. Verbal accounts, as developed by 
Elsbach (1994), are therefore strategies that convey how organisations explain their behaviour 
to manage stakeholders’ perception and their legitimacy. In visual terms it is possible to say 
that Oliver’s (1991) strategies are the “envelopes” that include the technical and institutional 
features of verbal accounts. In practical terms, and for analytical purposes, Oliver’s strategies 
are put into practice through the forms of verbal accounts, as developed by Elsbach, represented 






3. The company and its CEO 
This paper is based on the EDP case for several reasons. First, the company is a 
significant object of study for research into organisational strategic responses while facing 
constant challenges to its legitimacy due to the production contracts and support schemes of the 
electricity system. These represented controversial issues that directly affected EDP in the 
period from 2010 to 2014. In particular, the Custos para a Manutenção do Equilíbrio 
Contratual (CMEC) [Costs for the Maintenance of the Equilibrium System] paid to EDP under 
the ordinary regime generated considerable negative publicity in the media, an organisational 
legitimacy barometer (Deephouse, 1996). The second reason is related to the visibility and 
economic importance of the company in the domestic business environment. EDP is regarded 
as a relevant company in a sensitive sector from a political and social point of view, and 
therefore it is exposed to strong pressures and institutional expectations. The electricity sector 
and EDP in particular were targets of intense debate and political attention over the period under 
study. The electricity sector suffered the impact caused by the Portuguese request for financial 
assistance in May 2011, which lead to the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
with the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), known as the Troika. Public expectations that EDP should comply with 
the rules and the institutional pressures were particularly high. When a sector is “`politically 
salient´ as a result of economic, political, historical, or cultural attributes”, it creates a 
“widespread public interest in its operation and outcomes” (Henisz & Zelner, 2005, p. 362). In 
this sense, EDP proved to be a subject matter of interest for a theoretical understanding of 
“how” companies respond strategically to institutional processes through the CEO’s 
communications in the media.  
During the period of analysis, António Mexia was the CEO of EDP. He became CEO 
of EDP in 2006 after leaving the XVI Constitutional Government, where he was the Minister 
of Public Works, Transport and Communications. During his mandate, and following the 
European framework of policy liberalisation, the Decree-Law no. 240/2004 was issued. The 
Decree-law allowed the creation of the CMEC in replacement of the Contratos de Aquisição 
de Energia (CAE) [Power Purchase Agreements], which was requested to end under the 
2003/54/EC Directive of 26 June 2003 (EC, 2003). He is also considered to be a CEO with 
greater media coverage and a Portuguese manager with highly developed communication skills, 
which gave him “media strength and power to influence his peers” (Sobral, Guerreiro, & Prado, 
2013, p. 23). António Mexia had “against him the public opinion, always critical about the rise 
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in the cost of energy” (Sobral et al., 2013, p.23), but he used his communication skills in favour 
of, and to defend, EDP interests.   
In March 2012 the Secretary of State for Energy, Henrique Gomes, resigned. This 
resignation was “irredeemably linked to the power of António Mexia” (Andrade, 2012, p.67). 
Henrique Gomes was known to have publicly questioned the power of EDP in the electricity 
sector. During the eighth stage of EDP reprivatisation, the CEO “has succeeded to curtail the 
reformist impetus of the Secretary of State for Energy to apply a special levy on the energy 
sector which had EDP as the primary target” (Prado & Garrido, 2014, p.30). The proposal 
failed. António Mexia defended “tooth and nail” EDP contracts and rents before the government 
(Prado, 2012a, p.6).  
The issue of the rents in energy leapt into the public arena with the signing of the MoU. 
The sustainability of the electricity system and the worsening of electricity costs were two 
concerns of Troika with an impact on the competitiveness of the Portuguese economy. 
International bodies assumed that there were excessive rents in the electricity sector (EC, 
2012b). Regarding the energy policy, the MoU included a set of measures relating to the 
electricity sector that Portugal was obliged to respect. The need to comply with these measures 
and the financial and economic crisis intensified the debate on national energy policy. 
Renewable energy and CMEC were two of the compensation schemes imposed by cost 
reduction measures to ensure the sustainability of the national electricity system. The CMEC 
scheme was a significant part of EDP profits. EDP in the past had always rejected benefiting 
from excessive rents, making the government task to limit the policy costs embedded in CMEC 
difficult.  
Henrique Gomes left the government nine months after the beginning of the legislature 
in March 2012. The exit of the Secretary of State for Energy was widely reported in the main 
media in Portugal and the criticisms against EDP and its CEO intensified. EDP was regarded 
as “a state within a state that gave orders to successive governments” and its CEO was accused 
of “challenging the government” in office.2 Officially, Henrique Gomes left the government 
for personal reasons, but it became general public opinion that he had lost the “war” against 
EDP to reduce excessive rents (Andrade, 2012, p.67; Baptista, 2012, p.8). The weekly 
newspaper Expresso described the former Secretary of State for Energy as “an annoying voice 
(...) because he was the first to face the interests of one of the most powerful lobbies in Portugal: 
                                                 
2 See http://www.tvi24.iol.pt/videos/antonio-mexia-e-uma-pessoa-muito-poderosa/53f502113004540d1c4ea06d/ 
2240, accessed on 17 July 2012, and also http://economico.sapo.pt/noticias/mexia-e-uma-pessoa-muito-poderosa_ 
140493.html, accessed on 8 April 2012. 
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the electricity sector” (Expresso, 2013, p.2). On April 23rd 2013, in an interview on the TV 
station SIC Notícias, the Minister of Economy acknowledged that the exit of Henrique Gomes 
was due to a mechanism of energy lobby interests, a version which was confirmed by Henrique 
Gomes himself in an interview with the same TV station the day after. 
António Mexia enjoyed “a relationship with [political] power” that provided him “praise 
and, of course, criticism” (Prado & Garrido, 2014, p.30). Critics argued that António Mexia 
was the strong man in the energy sector in Portugal and had won the renegotiation of EDP rents 
(Bastos & Saraiva, 2012). It is important to highlight that from the beginning of the 
reprivatisation process, EDP had always strong direct ties to the largest political parties in 
Portugal. Since the 1990s, more than two dozen former members of Portuguese governments 
have passed through EDP’s corporate boards (EDP, 1997-2011, 2012a, 2013). EDP always had 
linkages to the policy-making process. As argued by Henisz and Zelner (2005, p.375), a 
“‘privileged’ organization, such as a long-standing incumbent, a state-owned enterprise or its 
privatized progeny, or a national champion, possesses the strongest ties to relevant political 
actors,” namely those who control resources required by an organisation, as is the case of EDP.3  
 
4. Research Method 
This research employs a qualitative case study within a methodological interpretive 
approach. We respond to the call by Beattie and Davison (2015) and Palea (2017) for more 
qualitative and critical research and in-depth analysis in an age of great uncertainty and change. 
The adoption of a case study is of particular interest in this research, since it facilitates a rich 
understanding of the environmental context influencing strategic responses of organisations to 
institutional pressures, and also of the processes being enacted (Parker, 2012). As argued by 
Cooper and Morgan (2008, p. 159), case study research is of particular relevance in “situations 
of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict”. The sources and the method of 
analysis are addressed in the following subsections. 
 
4.1.Sources 
All source documents are publicly available. Thirty-one communications by António 
Mexia in the media from March 2010 to February 2014 were collected. These include 
interviews in newspapers, magazines, and on radio and television stations, as well as statements 
                                                 
3 Henisz and Zelner (2005) argue that examples of companies whose competitive advantages appear linked to 
managing relationships with governments are abundant, especially in capital intensive industries or those marked 
by a strong public interest.  
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in press conferences (see Table 1).  The CEO interviews on the radio and television stations 
were transcribed by the first author. It was also necessary to elicit a detailed examination of 
other relevant sources in order to understand institutional expectations regarding EDP’s 
activities. These documents allow us to understand the environment in which EDP operated and 
to obtain useful information on relevant institutional actors. These data sources include: 
Entidade Reguladora dos Serviços Energéticos (ERSE) [Energy Services Regulatory 
Authority] reports and opinions of the ERSE Tariff Council; reports, recommendations and 
communications from the Autoridade da Concorrência (AdC) [Portuguese Competition 
Authority]; the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies; the MoU; reports and press 
releases of the IMF, the EC and the ECB; reports by the Banco de Portugal [Central Bank of 
the Portuguese Republic] and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD); government reports and press releases; several legal acts; press releases issued by the 
Associação para a Defesa do Consumidor (DECO) [Portuguese Association for Consumer 
Protection]; statements of officials and former officials; statements by representatives of the 
IMF, the ERSE, trade and industry associations and business leaders to the media; EdpON 
Magazine4, EDP annual reports and communications to the market; national newspapers and 
websites. 
 
[insert Table 1 here] 
 
Institutionalists suggest that the analysis of media sources may be particularly useful for 
studying the process of organisational legitimation (Baum & Powell, 1995). Previous research 
finds that corporate communications in the media provide appropriate “data that offer real-time 
accounts on events” (Sonpar, Pazzaglia, & Kornijenko, 2010, p.5). For instance, Nègre et al. 
(2017) examined press releases used by French Firms in order to announce downsizing 
operations and find that the disclosure of press releases is driven by both contextual and 
legitimacy factors. Stakeholders’ statements in the media provide information about 
institutional demands and expectations with regard to organisational behaviour. Indeed, a major 
function of the media is to provide a platform for disseminating stakeholders’ views concerning 
organisations (Bednar et al., 2013). The use of more than a single media source enables more 
informed interpretations of particular events (Archel, Husillos, Larrinaga, & Spence, 2009). We 
                                                 
4 This magazine is “delivered to important external partners – parliament chambers, parliamentary groups, 




believe that the newspapers and magazines and also the television stations we have selected 
provide a reasonable indication of the extent and tone of media coverage of controversial issues 
involving EDP and of the strategic responses by its CEO.5  
The identification of relevant publications for analysis was performed weekly through 
a search on the on-line newsstand at the initial phase of research. Later in the period from the 
end of 2011 until September 2014, considering the attention paid to the issue of electricity 
prices and excessive rents, it became an almost daily process. Whenever the full text of the 
press communications was not provided on-line, we secured a paper copy. During the research 
process, any António Mexia’s interview that was missing was obtained in the Biblioteca 
Municipal de Braga [Municipal Library of Braga]. 
 
4.2.Method of analysis 
 
From the sources used to understand the environment in which EDP operated, the initial 
objective of the analysis was to draw up a schedule of successive events and attacks upon EDP’s 
image and legitimacy to identify key stakeholders and understand their roles in the institutional 
process from 2010 to 2014. Through an examination of the chronologically organised data, it 
was possible to understand how societal actors perceived the information provided by EDP, 
what they expected from the company and what they considered to be appropriate 
organisational behaviour. With this contextual approach, we were able to capture “relevant 
features of shared understandings” or “sets of collective meanings that condition how 
organizational actors interpret and respond to the world around them” (Ventresca & Mohr, 
2002, p.819). The CEO communications were also organised chronologically.  
In the next phase, a multi-stage qualitative content analysis process was undertaken to 
investigate how EDP responded to the expectations of societal actors. Iterative processes were 
conducted individually by the first three authors. The theoretical framework, as formerly 
proposed, was used as an interpretive lens to analyse EDP’s CEO responses to institutional 
pressures and expectations.  
Consistent with previous qualitative research, we used a modified form of content 
analysis (e.g., Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013; Shapiro & Matson 2008) to examine the CEO 
                                                 
5 All articles and interviews published in print media and used in this research are publicly available on paper 
version in the Hemeroteca Municipal de Lisboa [Municipal Newspaper Library of Lisbon]. In Portugal, there are 
no databases which provide access to the full text of articles published in the print media.  
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communications.6 The analysis was not limited to examining the manifest content of the 
evidence, but also extended to the latent content (Berg, 2001). From this perspective, we 
considered not only what was said, but also “under what circumstances” it was said (Shapiro & 
Matson, 2008, p.205).  
In order to increase internal validity and reliability, the coding process was applied to 
each CEO communication independently by the first three researchers. In the first stage, 
Elsbach’s (1994) model guided the analysis in relation to the accusations faced by EDP and the 
consequent challenges to its legitimacy. Guided by Oliver’s (1991) typology, the second 
analysis phase sought to reveal the specific strategies adopted by the CEO of EDP. In the last 
step of the analysis, the main themes were interpreted and discussed. Later a joint analysis was 
made and any divergences debated until consensus was reached. To increase the reliability of 
our conclusions (Shapiro & Matson, 2008), we have highlighted examples that illustrate 
interpretations and expectations of key societal actors concerning EDP’s behaviour and its 
CEO’s, as well as several excerpts from António Mexia’s interviews. The choice made was to 
transcribe in bold the questions asked during the interviews, every time they proved to be 
relevant for clarifying the strategic response or whenever the issues emphasised in the question 
clearly showed the importance the external constituents placed upon a particular social problem 
and, as consequence, the institutional pressures exerted on EDP. The question is followed, in 
italics, by the answer provided by António Mexia. The reference at the end of the quotation 
identifies the journalist to whom António Mexia granted the interview. 
 
5. Institutional environment complexity: the issue of electricity bills and rents in the 
electricity sector – an endless debate 
Within the scope of EFAP, Portugal undertook a set of measures in the budgetary area, 
including a privatisation programme. This political process reinforced the neoliberal ideology 
of privatisation and market control as ‘higher order principles’ for institutional reform 
(Alawattage & Alsaid, 2018, p. 26, emphasis in the original). The Major Planning Options for 
2012-2015 defined a fiscal consolidation strategy consistent with the objectives of the EFAP. 
The privatisation programme was in line with the objectives of reducing the weight of the State 
in the economy and the deepening of European integration, in particular through the opening 
up of public company capital to foreign investment (Law 64-A/2011, 30 December). So, the 
last phase of reprivatisation of EDP resulted from an emergency imposed by the MoU under 
                                                 
6 Qualitative content analysis is the appropriate term to describe the approach to processing the data (e.g., Berg, 
2001; Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013).  
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the EFAP. At the end of 2011 the eighth phase of reprivatisation of EDP occurred through the 
direct sale of 21.35 per cent of EDP’s share capital to China Three Gorges Corporation. The 
programme’s structural reform agenda in the network and sheltered services sectors has 
established a number of commitments, including the conclusion of the electricity market 
liberalisation, the promotion of competition and the sustainability of the national electricity 
system. This demonstrates that political actors led Portugal to institutional transformations 
consistent with the neoliberal agenda and the market logic that had pervaded the Portuguese 
electricity sector. Over the programme, 12 review missions took place. In total, Portugal 
received 11 disbursements, corresponding to approximately 97 per cent of the agreed package.  
The cost of electricity was considered a threat to the competitiveness of the Portuguese 
economy and marked the agenda of the EC and the IMF during the EFAP (EC, 2012b). The 
issue attracted the media attention and it proved to be controversial for EDP.  The company was 
accused of being the main beneficiary of the excessive rents in the electricity sector at the 
expense of consumers and the economy. This gave rise to an endless debate concerning 
electricity bills and rents to energy suppliers.  
The deterioration of the Portuguese economy illuminated the controversy around 
electricity prices. In 2009 serious criticism arose regarding the Portuguese energy policy. The 
support schemes for renewable producers faced growing opposition from certain sectors of the 
civil society and economy, arguing that the subsidies to renewable energies granted to producers 
contributed to “aggravate, in an unjustifiable manner, the electricity prices to smaller and retail 
end-users of electricity, particularly families” (Silva, 2010, p. 18). However, renewable 
energies were not the only ones with additional costs which in turn increased electricity bills. 
This reality extended to electricity production under the ordinary regime. The opinion by the 
ERSE Tariff Council confirmed that the growth of the Custos de Interesse Económico Geral 
(CIEG)7 [Costs of Services of General Economic Interest] put the sustainability of the 
electricity sector at risk (ERSE, 2010).  
With the creation of the Iberian Electricity Market, by July 2007, the pre-existing CAE 
that prevailed in the Public Electricity System became extinct
 
and was replaced by the CMEC 
compensation scheme. In force since July 2007, this mechanism was regulated by Decree-Law 
no. 240/2004, of 27 December. In both schemes, asset remuneration was guaranteed and 
independent from market income. 
                                                 
7 The CIEG include the additional costs associated with the production of electricity under the special and ordinary 
(CMEC, CAE and power guarantee mechanism) regimes, the rental payments to the municipalities and others 
costs, such as those engendered by the geographical situation of the Portuguese autonomous regions (ERSE, 2011). 
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In April 2004, the AdC presented a report which identified CMEC as a distortion of 
competition “biased” in favour of EDP (AdC, 2004, emphasis added). The excessive nature of 
the remuneration provided by CMEC was identified from its origin by ERSE. The regulator’s 
view of the proposal of Decree-Law no.240/2004 pointed to its negative consequences in terms 
of electricity prices and the risks of overcompensation beyond the expected profitability of 7.5 
percent, at the “expense of consumers” (ERSE, 2004, p.153). The Decree-Law no. 240/2004 
resulted in a decrease in the regulatory power of ERSE in the definition and monitoring of 
compensations payments received by energy suppliers, particularly in relation to the 
supervision of CAE. Conflicting interests between the State shareholder and the State regulator 
help to explain the issue of excessive rents in this specific context. 
The strong impact that CMEC had on end-user electricity prices led the EC, the IMF 
and the ECB to impose a revision of the compensation paid to producers under the ordinary 
regime until the end of 2011. The decision would affect the expected EDP revenues, a reason 
for which the company led by António Mexia fought against any change that would harm the 
contract value previously assumed by the Portuguese government.  
The year of 2012 emerged as a very contentious one for EDP with the involvement of 
the government and the company in “disputes around the rents” in the electricity sector (Prado, 
2013b, p.16). The renegotiation of the support to energy producers was one of the most 
newsworthy of the year and motivated reactions from a range of political backgrounds. In an 
interview with a business newspaper, when questioned on the position taken by EDP regarding 
the revision of the CMEC, Henrique Gomes argued that “to the excessive market power and 
influence of EDP, the government must impose public interest. It is a question of sovereignty” 
(Prado, 2012b, p.10). Jorge Vasconcelos, former president of ERSE, stated that, in ten years of 
political functions, he had “the opportunity to interact with seven Ministers of Economy and all 
of them, with no exception, benefited, one way or another, the national champion [EDP]. (...) it 
is completely privatised, but there is an unhealthy culture of promoting national champions” 
(Ferreira, 2012b, p.4). 
Henrique Gomes resigned as Secretary of State for Energy after having been hindered 
in presenting his remarks in a public university (Lisbon School of Economics and Management) 
on the case of excessive rents (Garrido, 2012). Immediately after his resignation, Henrique 
Gomes publicly denounced an extremely serious event: the supposedly “confidential” report 
drawn up by the office of the Secretary of State for Energy and sent to the office of the Prime 
Minister, a few hours later, was in the hands of the board of EDP (Sequeira, 2012). EDP 
indicated on several occasions that it would fight to defend its interests and always left open 
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the possibility of taking legal action (A.M. Gonçalves, 2013; Prado, 2013b). The third review 
of the EFAP imposed an obligation to eliminate the power guarantee mechanism support and 
to reduce explicit subsidies for the cogeneration regime. In other areas, which included the 
CMEC of EDP and renewable energies, the government adopted a negotiation approach. The 
differential treatment was justified by the existing contracts between the state and the 
companies, where EDP was an especial case.  
The Siderurgia Nacional [National Steelyard] admitted closing the facilities in Portugal 
and relocating its economic activity to Spain with the threat of dismissal of 750 employees 
(Lopes, 2013). At stake were the high electricity costs: “totally inadequate as far as the reality 
is concerned” (Andrade & Atalaia, 2013, p.17). The AdC recommended that the government 
commissioned an independent audit of the risk of over-compensation in the adjustment 
calculations of the CMEC scheme (AdC, 2013). This regulator pointed out that the manner in 
which [...] CMEC are calculated enabled EDP to control the compensations received and 
“enlarge the economic advantage over its competitors” (AdC, 2013, p.6).  
In October 2013, the government announced a special levy on energy operators. Part of 
the revenue generated by this levy aimed to reduce the tariff debt. The largest energy operators 
protested against the new measure. EDP was one of the first to react. The “arm wrestle” became 
quite clear (Mendes, 2013, p.14), but EDP did not succeed in avoiding the levy collection. At 
the end of April 2014, the government presented a third package of measures to reduce energy 
costs, but this was not only directed at electricity companies but at the whole energy sector. The 
energy rent cuts impose by the EFAP were scattered over different players, thus mitigating the 
impact on EDP annual accounts (EDP, 2014; Prado, 2014).  
Table 2 shows the dates of the main events and documents which exert institutional 
pressures and impose expectations on EDP. 
 
[insert Table 2 here] 
 
6. The CEO’s discourse and the quest for legitimacy 
The controversy involving EDP regarding the issue of electricity bills and excessive 
rents in the electricity sector gave rise to several accusations that took on newsworthy contours. 
During the period of analysis, it was possible to identify complex institutional pressures and 
main accusations addressed to EDP. Table 3 summarises the main accusations and the 




[insert Table 3 here] 
 
6.1. Electricity prices in Portugal are higher than in other EU countries: denial and 
manipulation 
The proposal for the average rise in electricity prices for 2011 was conditioned by the 
new increase of the CIEG in electricity bills and amounted to EUR 2.4 billion (ERSE, 2010). 
This figure represents an increase of 31.8 per cent compared to 2010 (ERSE, 2010). In 
December 2010, the DECO submitted a petition to the Portuguese Parliament to pressure the 
government into reducing the CIEG and, consequently, the bill paid by consumers (DECO, 
2010). ERSE argued that CIEG accounted for more than 40 per cent of the average price paid 
by end-users of the low-voltage segment – households (ERSE, 2010). The ERSE Tariff Council 
advocated urgent and effective measures for reducing CIEG in the electricity sector, a situation 
about which the regulator had been warning since 2007 (ERSE, 2007). The ERSE’ s warning 
call and the pressure exerted by the association led to an extensive debate on the subject in the 
Portuguese Parliament in January 2011. Both attempted to transform this institutional 
arrangement by influencing the parliamentary parties to enact new legislation. These pressures 
put the issue on the policy-making agenda. During the debate with DECO, ERSE, EDP and 
representatives of business associations, the Confederation of the Portuguese Industry ensured 
that the companies in Portugal were subjected to excessively high energy prices – much higher 
than the prices of Spain, hence impairing them in their competitiveness (Prado, 2011).  
 The CEO had always denied that electricity prices in Portugal were higher than in other 
EU countries, but when confronted with the growing number of complaints from representatives 
of the national industry, as well as from DECO and the regulator, EDP made increasing use of 
strategic responses beyond the simple denial, moving on to manipulation. The company tried 
to manipulate its institutional environment through an influencing tactic, with António Mexia 
arguing that electricity prices were not a problem for Portugal’s competitiveness, for 
households or even for companies. The CEO relied repeatedly on Eurostat and Instituto 
Nacional de Estatística (INE) [National Statistical Institute] – two institutional references. It 
seems likely that this indicates that the CEO intended to render its accounts more trustworthy:  
Instead of distributing dividends to the shareholders and raising the wages of the 
employees, did you not think more about your customers? A lot has been said on the price 
of electricity. This is a very important issue! The last statistical data from Eurostat – not ours, 
people like European statistics, here it is, Eurostat. And Eurostat tells us one thing: Portugal 





The CEO of EDP seemed to believe that the reference to these normative features would 
provide constituents with validating evidence to support the accounts, in line with Elsbach 
(1994). EDP’s position “on the generation market meant that, virtually all of the time, EDP was 
indispensable to satisfy demand of electricity” (AdC, 2009, p.26), making consumers almost 
captive. The regulator itself had limitations in terms of independence and administrative 
autonomy, which the EC and the IMF sought to strengthen through the transposition of the 
Third EU Energy Package by the end of June 2011. The reprivatisation process initiated in 1997 
did little to change the “monopoly character” of the company. It is in this context that EDP 
maintained a clearly low risk profile, with a business model based on almost 90 per cent long-
term contracts and regulated activities (EDP, 2012a), thereby reducing uncertainty regarding 
future income. In this type of scenario, when organizations were not heavily dependent on the 
source of pressures, and the degree of uncertainty is low, the more active strategies were a 
response to institutional forces (Oliver, 1991). 
Always sticking to the European or national statistics not adjusted for purchasing power, 
António Mexia fought back, repeatedly, stating that the electricity prices in Portugal were below 
the EU average.  
The Portuguese can rest assured, in the sense that energy is on the side of the solution in 
Portugal. (..). prices in Portugal are lower than in Spain, our neighbour, and the European 
average. That is true for companies, which makes it easy to understand that there is no 
competitiveness problem for electricity. It only represents 1.7% of business costs. (...) Energy 
represents 2.5% of the shopping basket of households. All these figures come from Eurostat or 
other European statistics. We do not, therefore, have any problem with competitiveness or 
quality of life due to electricity. (Marcelino & Baldaia, 2012, p.9)  
 
The selection of specific Eurostat’s official statistics (not expressed in purchasing power 
standards) reveals an attempt by the CEO to influence the external constituents perception of 
the “myth” concerning the idea that electricity was a part of the problem of Portuguese 
economic growth. The same strategies were seen in EDP Annual Reports. 
Based on Eurostat statistics, the EDP Annual Reports pointed out that retail electricity prices in 
Portugal have been consistent with EU’s average both for industrial and domestic users (EDP, 
2011, 2013). But Eurostat data indicated that, when adjusted for purchasing power, Portugal 
had the fourth highest household electricity prices in EU27 (EC, 2013). 
 
6.2.EDP is responsible for the increase in electricity costs: denial and avoidance  
EDP was accused of being responsible for the increase in electricity costs. António 
Mexia adopted denial and avoidance strategies as a response. More specifically, the company 
used a buffering tactic to reduce external constituents’ scrutiny by avoiding any responsibility 
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for the increase in electricity bills. This defensive response was used between 2011 and 2013 
when EDP was facing pressure and expectations from the government and the remaining 
constituents, whose prescriptions conflicted with the business interests of the company. The 
evidence suggests that the CEO brushed off responsibility for any increase in electricity bills 
onto other agents or external factors and in this way tried to create a scapegoat for the problem.  
The opinion by ERSE Tariff Council confirmed that the sustainability of the electricity 
sector was at stake (ERSE, 2010). António Mexia resorted to buffering tactics to avoid any 
responsibility for determining the definition of the electricity tariff, arguing that it was defined 
by ERSE in the regulated market and by competition in the liberalised one. The reference to a 
normative procedure – ERSE – seems to support the denial tactic making it more believable.  
It is clear! But regarding the petition by Deco: is there, or is there not, margin to lower the 
electricity bill in the short term? Once again, I would like it to be clear: the establishment of 
the electricity bill has to do with decisions – whether from the regulator [ERSE], in the regulated 
market, or options of energy policy – which are not ours to make. Both the former and the latter 
– we have nothing to do with that. And in the component “energy”, it is all about competition. 
EDP has, nowadays, strong competition, particularly from the Spanish operators: Endesa, 
Iberdrola, Gás Natural... all of them. (Marcelino, 2011, p.4)  
 
The CEO also drew on neoliberal rhetoric to avoid accepting the responsibility for the 
increase in electricity costs, justifying that the liberalisation has allowed the market to work. 
And stated that “... the market works! What needs to be done for this? Competition. And the 
Iberian market is one of the most competitive. The wholesale market price at MIBEL was the 
lowest in Europe ...” (Marcelino & Baldaia, 2012, p.9). But although open to competition, in 
practice the electricity sector functioned under remuneration schemes, such CAE, CMEC and 
feed-in tariffs, and was “highly concentrated in the hands of the incumbent” (OECD, 2013, 
p.14). Indeed, the regulator itself reported that the sum of the guaranteed price energies (among 
which are PRE + CAE + CMEC) corresponded to 91 per cent of the global consumption, 
implying that under these conditions effective market competition had a very reduced 
expression (ERSE, 2013). 
The CMEC were considered one of the main policy costs embedded in CIEG (ERSE, 
2010).  EC indicated that the CMEC regime was “one of the main factors behind the continued 
build-up of the tariff debt” (EC, 2012a, p.38) and all the CMEC power plants belonged to EDP. 
António Mexia tried also to disconnect EDP from the problem by claiming that the company 
had nothing to do with CIEG as EDP only charged this in order to later hand in the revenue. 
This clarification came following the petition presented by DECO, which asked for cost-cutting 
measures in the electricity sector. António Mexia wanted to make it clear that there was a set 
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of costs charged in the customer’s bill which were related to the energy policy defined by the 
government and not by the company.  
Following the complaint by DECO regarding the composition of the electricity bill, even 
after the explanations presented [by EDP], people still think they pay the most expensive 
electricity in Europe. To us, that issue was important. Firstly, it enabled us to explain that, in 
more than half the households bill, EDP is charging for a third party. I believe the message 
went through. We did an opinion survey that concluded that people understood that there are a 
lot of things which have nothing to do with energy. Will it matter to repeat it yet again? Then 
that is what we will do. (Lima & Andrade, 2011, p.6) 
 
CIEG included the additional costs associated with electricity production under the 
special regime relating to renewable and non-renewable energies. António Mexia highlighted 
that it was “fundamental” to separate the different technologies so that the public did not form 
a mistaken view about the real cost of electricity production from renewable energy sources. In 
December 2010, António Mexia was heard at the Portuguese Parliament by the Economic 
Affairs and Energy Committee8, to which he presented the version of EDP on the impact of 
such technologies on the electricity sector. The CEO emphasised that the production of 
electricity under the special regime was divided into 55 per cent wind energy and 45 per cent 
cogeneration: the latter benefiting mainly the industry and not having anything to do with 
renewable energies (Jornal de Negócios, 2010), buffering the pressures that came from the 
multiple constituents.  
The main arguments against the strong policy emphasis on the production of energy 
under the special regime were not related to technology, but rather to the ineffective policy of 
subsidising. According to the regulator, the additional cost of special regime production for 
2011 was up 50 percent over 2009 (ERSE, 2010). The CEO defended this, arguing that the 
renewable energies in Portugal were not a structural additional cost. The denials were supported 
by institutional arguments, which repeatedly signaled the positive effect of renewable energies 
both on the stability of electricity prices and on the national energy bill: 
There is a petition from DECO against... Before the petition from DECO... I have absolutely 
no doubt that, from the renewable point of view, the joint bet on wind and water is very 
important – on which we have, right now, the biggest project for water development of all 
Europe; they are own resources, which replace imports. And all renewable sources of energy, 
last year, saved Portugal EUR 850 million in transfer of wealth abroad. This means that, the 
Portuguese need to work less hours today in order to import energy. This is the main issue. 
Energy is half the external deficit. (Marcelino, 2011, p.3) 
 
                                                 
8 This was the only committee at which the CEO testified during the period of study. 
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The denials were also combined with reference to technical features. In fact, he 
explained that wind energy generation was fully competitive, justifying the commitment to this 
type of technology on the basis of its efficiency, as the following transcripts demonstrate:  
  
Do you bluntly stand by that what the consumers pay extra for the production under 
special regime in the bill should be maintained because there is a strong wind component 
and is it justified? What I think is that we have the lowest wind tariff in whole Europe. It is the 
lowest remuneration of the entire new wind farm there is in Europe. (Ferreira, 2011) 
 
 A wind farm today, with a barrel of oil at 105 dollars – even taking into account the thermal 
backup energy when there is no wind – is competitive, for example, with a gas central. (Lima & 
Andrade, 2011, p.6) 
 
In response to the increasing activity and visibility of DECO and the regulator in the 
political debate, the CEO put the focus on the international evolution in the price of fossil fuels 
as largely responsible for the rise in electricity tariffs. In this regard, António Mexia stressed 
that most of the tariff debt was incurred in 2008 when the government impeded the passing-on 
of oil price increases in the end-users’ tariffs, and thereby tried to avoid the conditions that 
made conformity necessary: “The deficit (tariff) was created in 2008, in Portugal, due to the 
rise of the price of fossil fuels. It has nothing to do with the renewable energy …” (Lima & 
Andrade, 2011, p. 6). Later, António Mexia explained the burden using a fiscal reason, arguing 
that the increase of the VAT rate from 6 to 23 per cent for electricity in October 2011 led to an 
increase in the price of electricity (Sousa, 2012).  
The coercive pressures exerted by the EFAP has buttressed normative expectations. The 
second update of the MoU required a report on the efficiency of support schemes for renewables 
and the possibility of agreeing a renegotiation of the contracts in view of a lower feed-in tariff 
for existing contracts in renewables (EC, 2011b). The EDP Renováveis (EDPR) Annual Report 
highlighted the “number of persistent myths about renewable energy that have penetrated public 
opinion” and were “influencing the political landscape around the world”, giving the 
misconception that renewable energy would always rely on subsidies to be competitive (EDPR, 
2013, p.8). In the political discussion about the issue, António Mexia responded by arguing that 
EDP as being only one of the market players and almost all of the business of EDPR was 
situated outside Portugal, buffering the company from institutional pressures:  
The deadline ends at the end of the month, the Troika makes the decision regarding the 
next tranche of loan to Portugal depend on the solution of this commitment. (...) Very often 
[the attention] is focused on EDP, but there are many other operators. Particularly, EDP has 
only 16 per cent of the renewable in Portugal. There are 84 per cent that belong to other 
operators. (Sousa, 2012)  
 
However, the EDPR 2012 Annual Report showed that the Portuguese market was by far 
the most profitable, accounting for 40 per cent of the net profit attributable to equity holders 
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and had a return on equity of 46 per cent (mainly wind energy). The US and Spanish markets, 
representing 38 per cent and 34 per cent of EDPR’s turnover, had a profitability of 0.6 per cent 
and 2.9 per cent, respectively. In addition, the third review of the EFAP underlined the need for 
further assessment of the cost-efficiency of the support schemes for renewables (EC, 2012b).   
 
6.3.EDP’s profits are due to electricity bills: denial, avoidance, and manipulation 
EDP was accused of accumulating exceptional profits at the expense of consumers and 
the economy.  António Mexia denied that EDP’s profits were due to electricity prices, rejecting 
that the consumer was subsidising the EDP Group’s activity. Avoidance and manipulation 
strategies were used as a response to institutional pressures. The denial relied on technical-
accounting language and a symbolic strategy of concealment of financial information, which 
might undermine organisational legitimacy. António Mexia claimed that EDP’s profits were a 
consequence of its internationalisation and improved operational efficiency and seemed to 
believe that these technical arguments made its accounts more believable. The concealment 
tactic was seen through the repeated presentation of the company’s results in terms of EBITDA, 
in which the CEO emphasised that the increase of EBITDA was mainly due to the strong growth 
in international markets: 
When EDP was privatised, it depended 100% on Portugal market. Today, less than 50% of the 
gross operating profits come from Portugal. Regulated revenues from our activities fell from 
EUR 700 to about EUR 500 million, which shows the improvement of the efficiency. It is not the 
regulated activities [one should read, the consumer] that sustain EDP’s profits. (Figueiredo & 
Suspiro, 2010, p.25) 
 
 
The group is often criticised for having a monopolist rent which enables the leverage of 
the company to the expansion abroad. How do you comment on that? That is, to say the 
least, an out of dated truth. As far as the monopoly is concerned: 55% of the EDP’s operating 
profit comes from abroad... (Prado, 2010, p.6) 
 
EDP achieved its best ever operating profits in 2011, with EBITDA growing 4 per cent 
to EUR 3.756 billion and net operating profits also growing by 4 per cent to EUR 1.125 billion 
(EDP, 2011). The EFAP to Portugal and the rise in the price of electricity put EDP on the media 
agenda, intensifying and giving visibility to the accusation, as evidenced on the following 
transcripts: 
In a crisis year, EDP had the highest profit ever. Are you not charging too much 
consumers? 
No. This 4% increase, it´s important for people to realise this at home, this is very important 
because there is a lot of misinformation about it. The 4% increase in EDP’s profit is mainly 
due to the international market where we have increased our gross operating results by 11%, 
with Portugal falling by 5%. It is normal for the results to increase because EDP has invested 




After all, how much are the regulated activities and the contracts of EDP in Portugal 
worth? The operating profits in Portugal already represent, right now, less than 40% of the 
total. In 2002, EDP registered in Portugal, in nominal terms, exactly the same as it did in 1997, 
which means that after 14 years, in real terms, the operating profits are 40% below what they 
were in the end of the last century, and the distributed energy increased by 60%. (Costa & Lira, 
2013, p.6)  
 
But the EDP 2012 Annual Report showed that the lower risk businesses (regulated 
concessions, long-term contracts and wind farms under a feed-in tariff scheme) were almost 
exclusively concentrated in Portugal and accounted for about 71 per cent of the EDP Group’s 
net profit, although they represented only 45 per cent of EBITDA and approximately 40 per 
cent of the turnover. Liberalised activities, with a turnover of EUR 8.3 billion (representing 
around 50 per cent of the whole Group), had a negative net profit (EDP, 2012a). In particular, 
the CMEC represented between 14.9 and 34.2 per cent of profit before taxes for the EDP Group 
from 2007 to 2012 (AdC, 2013; EDP, 2006-2011, 2012a). AdC recommended a review of the 
CMEC with the aim of ensuring that the compensation paid to EDP was determined by more 
stringent efficiency criteria for the benefit of consumers (AdC, 2013). 
Financial reporting is beyond the comprehension levels of most of the general public 
(Bartlett & Chandler, 1997). However, the symbolic strategy of concealment of information did 
not escape criticism from certain constituents who contended that high electricity prices to end-
users were at the root of EDP’s historical profits. The perception that EDP’s top management 
was selective in its provision of financial information was revealed by Henrique Gomes himself 
and led him to state publicly that: “EDP lives at the expense of the Portuguese” (Gomes, 2013).  
Similar to its use of technical features, António Mexia recurrently mentioned 
institutional features to support denials, pointing out EDP’s fulfilment of socially desirable 
goals as the main driving force of the Portuguese economy, and it being the largest investor in 
Portugal and an employment creator. This seemed to be an attempt to make the company less 
vulnerable to external criticism. The CEO exclusively emphasised EDP’s positive 
achievements, with no mention of any negative impact from its activities. This clearly suggests 
a window dressing approach. In a national context where recession brought growing social 
problems, the CEO may have used these positive accounts as proof of EDP’s social fitness, as 
suggested in the following quotations:  
You do not compromise on this matter [to lower the price of electricity on the short term]? It 
is not a commitment. We are doing, it is, our job: to invest in Portugal, to create employment, 
to create conditions to make this sector more competitive. (Marcelino, 2011, p.4) 
 
There is unevenness between the social and the price of electricity. Does that not shock 
you? On the social question, I could not agree more. EDP is today the largest investor in 
Portugal, the largest Portuguese investor abroad. We invested EUR 1.7 billion since 2005 until 
today. We are going to invest EUR 5 billion more until 2020, improving by 91 per cent the 
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quality of service…. That is the main function of EDP. (Sousa, 2013) 
 
The window dressing tactic is also evident in António Mexia’s accounts, when he 
assumed that the reduction of electricity bill costs was part of EDP’s business model, through 
the promotion of energy efficiency, investing in technological innovation and also helping 
business and household consumers with energy saving measures: “[P]eople adopted different 
behaviours, which we fostered, such as the energy efficiency with the reduction in energy 
consumption. EDP usually invests annually between EUR 8 and 10 million to help people save 
on their electricity bill” (Sousa, 2012). There seems to be evidence that EDP attempted to 
identify itself with a legitimate social practice of customer support to appear consistent with 
institutional expectations. In this respect, ERSE provided financial support through a tender 
mechanism to the measures promoted by EDP aimed at improving efficiency in electricity 
consumption. EDP saw approved for the period 2009/2010 measures equivalent to EUR 5.9 
million, about 30 per cent of the total made available by ERSE (EDP, 2009; ERSE, 2009). 
These incentives were supported through the System Tariff, paid by all consumers. 
EDP responses also involved a co-optation tactic. In order to deal with external 
criticism, António Mexia’s denials repeatedly cited an institutional measure, the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index, presumably to support the claims that it was not the Portuguese customers 
who were bearing EDP’s activities and to demonstrate the company’s worthiness and 
acceptability. The company was acknowledged among utilities with the best performance both 
at European and worldwide levels by the Dow Jones Sustainability Index since 2008, and the 
CEO made a point of highlighting it in several interviews throughout the period under review: 
“Being included in the indexes is important because we test ourselves. Everything must be 
measurable, especially in these areas where there can be other interpretations: it is only for 
one’s conscience to be at peace. We do not agree” (Proença, 2010, p.34); “… it [Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index] speaks about economy, it speaks about results, it speaks about the social 
and people inside and outside the company, it speaks about environment. We were considered 
the best company in the utilities sector worldwide!” (Baldaia & Neutel, 2013, p.9); “…No one 
can give lessons about “the social [dimension]” to EDP” (Sousa, 2013). 
 
6.4. EDP enjoys excessive rents from contracts regarded as illegal: denial, defiance, and 
manipulation 
The MoU explicitly stated that measures must be taken in order “to limit the additional 
cost associated with the production of electricity under the ordinary regime, in particular 
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through renegotiation or downward revision of the guaranteed compensation mechanism 
(CMEC) paid to producers under the ordinary regime” (EC, 2011a, p.24). The IMF, the EC and 
the ECB became a new source of pressures, which included extensive media coverage of the 
issue. The inconsistency between institutional pressures and organisational internal goals of 
profitability led to more active strategies. The company objected mainly to any changes in 
CMEC. EDP did not want to give way on the profitability guaranteed by this mechanism and 
did not accept the pressure as legitimate, demonstrating publicly its resistance to any contract’ 
amendments through a defiance strategy. At the press conference for the presentation of the 
quarterly financial results on May 2011, António Mexia used a dismissal tactic by emphasising 
that the contracts were not meant to be nullified and EDP would not abandon the value of the 
contracts freely signed: “EDP does not renounce, it cannot do so, of the value of the contract 
and the latter was not drawn up yesterday. It is meant to be looked at throughout the whole 
period of its life” (Jornal Público, 2011, “The amendment of contracts”, para.3). 
The highlight of the battle fought between EDP and the government took place in 2011 
during the last phase of the reprivatisation process of the company (A.M.Gonçalves, 2013). On 
this occasion, the Ministry of Finance did not want the rent-reducing measures to have an 
impact on the company value and, in turn, on the success of the last phase of reprivatisation, 
which was at the EFAP (Garrido & Prado, 2012a). The conflict between selling public assets at 
a valuable price – positive for the State – and cutting costs that are revenue and earnings of 
these companies – positive for the economy, led to a dispute between the Ministries of Economy 
and Finance. Within this political-economic system, EDP’s action was consistent with the 
privatisation objective: to attract private investors by reducing uncertainty regarding high future 
profits. Whereas shareholders are interested in maximizing returns, governments “have more 
complex preferences shaped by multiple interest group pressures” (Henisz & Zelner, 2005, 
p.361). The reprivatisation process exacerbated the multiple conflicting pressures. 
As a consequence of the breach in the negotiation process between EDP and the Ministry 
of Economy “the confrontation tone between Henrique Gomes and the CEO of EDP, António 
Mexia, rose” (Ferreira, 2012a, p.7) at the end of September 2011.  Henriques Gomes recognized 
that he was able to reach an agreement in principle with other generation companies, but as far 
as the CMEC were concerned it was essentially “EDP which opposed and moved its influences” 
(Prado, 2012c, p.8; see also Ferreira, 2012a). Within the framework of the second update of the 
MoU, a new measure was introduced to set the national electricity system on a sustainable path, 
requiring the elimination of the tariff debt by 2020 and its stabilisation by 2013 through the 
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correction of “excessive rents in the standard (CMECs, PPAs, and power guarantee 
mechanism)” (EC, 2011b, p.63). 
 In January 2012, responding to measure 5.15 of the updated MoU, the office of the 
Secretary of State for Energy produced a report evaluating the effective rates of return for the 
different generation regimes in order to identify the sources of excessive rents..9 The report 
revealed that the total value of excessive rents associated with the CMEC scheme up to 2020 
was EUR 2,133 million.10 This report set the sector “boiling” and contributed to the 
radicalisation of positions between the Secretary of State for Energy and EDP (Ferreira, 2012c, 
p.2). For the company, the issue of excessive rents was a false problem. After the reprivatisation 
of EDP, at the end of 2011, the attack on excessive rents by the government has become more 
difficult. Before the incommensurability of the interests of the different actors – shareholders, 
the government, the regulator, trade and industry associations, DECO and society in general –, 
EDP chose in the first instance to challenge and reject the demands of both the government and 
society in order to meet those of shareholders. In fact, in defence of the accusation of benefiting 
from excessive rents, EDP went beyond mere denial and challenged the legitimacy of the 
accusation. During the presentation of the EDP’s annual accounts, on March 8th 2012, Antonio 
Mexia took the opportunity to answer that accusation, repeating that the study elaborated on by 
the Secretary of State for Energy’s Office, which led the government to this conclusion, had 
“coarse and basic mistakes” which rendered it “useless and unusable” (Ferreira, 2012a, p.7; 
Prado & Garrido, 2012, p.4), calling into question the technical legitimacy of the Secretary of 
State for Energy’s Office. The CEO supported denials with accounting language that in his view 
rationalised it: “it is a mistake to consider that any investment with an internal rate of return 
(IRR) higher than the average cost of capital has a rent,” adding that, “the IRR must be higher 
than the cost of capital. If it is not so, one does not invest!” (Prado & Garrido, 2012, p.4). 
Defiance indicates a resistance to changing the business model of the company and was a 
predictable tactic for a company that had the power to influence its environment, in accordance 
with DiMaggio (1988) and Shapiro and Matson (2008). This strategic response also seemed to 
correspond with a warning addressed to shareholders that the issue was under control and that 
it would not transform into a reduction in the future profitability of the company. Theses 
                                                 
9The official report was only made public by the media. See Garrido & Prado (2012b) and 
http://www.tvi24.iol.pt/aa---vídeos---sociedade/edp-henrique-gomes-tvi24/1343990-5795.html, accessed on 18 
May 2012. 
10 This value has been determined by evaluating differences between the benchmark on rate of return estimated by 
Cambridge Economic Policy Associates (7.55 per cent) and the effective rate of return for the generation assets 
under CMEC regime (14.22 per cent). 
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tensions were also visible in the EDP Annual Report (2011, p.126), which stated that the 
business risk might be influenced by measures that may be adopted under the EFAP, “although 
the Portuguese Government has publicly expressed the purpose of not unilaterally establish 
[sic] measures that may have negative impact on the national energy sector”. Coercive 
compliance did not have legal force and EDP faced no real threat of sanction. 
The contestation of institutional expectations was reinforced by demonstrations of 
organisational rationality in order to legitimate non-compliance. For example, the CEO engaged 
in rationalisations for investment decisions in a market system, claiming that without stability 
of rules, there would be no new investment in the electricity sector because a potential 
amendment of the contracts signed with the state compromised the credibility of a country. 
Similarly, in an attempt to redefine the public opinion in favour of EDP regarding the adequacy 
of its actions, he invoked the acquired rights to avoid renegotiating any amendment of CMEC, 
and assured all that EDP was receiving exactly what had been defined in 1996 when the CMEC 
mechanism was drawn. This was a response to the institutional environment based on the 
appreciation by its CEO that any alteration of contracts was neither rational nor acceptable, as 
the following quotations seem to suggest: 
But are these contracts not maladjusted to the present? (...) We are merely respecting that 
which are the contracts and these contracts are not different from any other contract. Contracts 
are to be respected. This is a decisive question. (Costa & Lira, 2013, p.6)   
 
Every day, the Portuguese see contracts being breached, beginning with those of the Social 
Security. These are very different themes. In the Social Security department, the important 
questions have to do with the sustainability of the system. Here, we are talking about something 
else, one must signal that there are stable rules for investment and that the investment is the 
decisive question for Portugal. Why? Because without investment there is no growth and with 
no growth there is no sustainability for our life model. (Costa, 2014, p.17) 
 
Associated with the denial strategy, António Mexia also adopted a manipulation 
response. He tried to change the content of institutional expectations on the remuneration of the 
CMEC scheme and the alleged illegality of this mechanism through an influence tactic. This 
included mentioning universities’ and consultants’ studies, which argued there were no 
excessive rents (Faria, 2012; V.Gonçalves, 2013). This response seemed to be intended to 
support the arguments of the CEO that the company did not benefit from rents, and to 
demonstrate its credibility before the external constituents. Another example of an influence 
tactic involved the opportunistic reference to the EC on the approval of CMEC. According to 
industry specialists, the CMEC configured “government support, which was illegal under 
European law” and they had “an economic mismatch in the electricity system which was 
illegitimate” (Prado, 2012c, p.8). On September 2012, the EC received a complaint filed by 
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private citizens against alleged illegal State aid granted by Portugal to EDP and it decided to 
initiate the formal investigation procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU. António Mexia always argued that this guaranteed compensation 
mechanism was approved by the EC as a replacement for the CAE, a normative procedure that, 
according to the CEO, demonstrated the legality of the EDP’s contracts was as unquestionable 
as the company’s legitimacy. In the CEO’s own words: 
You get a bonus granted by the State... (...) The claim against EDP at the European Union is 
unfounded. This was done with a contract that results from an international tender where the 
cheapest won. The CMEC were approved by Brussels based on the Decree-Law no. 240/2004, 
and they were a demand from Brussels. (Sousa, 2013) 
 
6.5. EDP does not participate in the efforts requested to all Portuguese: denial and compromise 
The institutionalised expectations of societal agents rendered EDP more vulnerable to 
institutional pressure on the issue of excessive rents. Under the Loan Facility Agreement on the 
European Financial Stability Facility financing quarterly disbursements was subject to the 
compliance with the conditions of the MoU. However, conformity to institutional expectations 
was incompatible with the company’s profitability goals, which did not allow EDP to 
unconditionally accept institutional demands. The coercive objectives and pressures from the 
political field (Troika and Government) maintained a strong need for EDP compliance. There 
were no legal mechanisms for enforcement, but Troika became the most important source of 
institutional pressure. These coercive pressures were visible in the press release in February 
2012 on the third review mission to Portugal: “a web of excessive rents...  put socially unfair 
burdens on consumers and taxpayers. ... Both the pace and scope of these reform efforts [to 
reduce rents in energy markets] should be stepped up” (IMF, 2012, p.3) and were salient in the 
media (Bastos & Saraiva, 2012; Ferreira, 2012a, 2012c; Prado, 2012a, 2012b; Sequeira, 2012).  
Evidence suggests that in order to meet the government’s and society’s expectations, 
the intransigence of EDP to accept any revision of remuneration schemes gave way to a less 
aggressive strategy. As previously noted, government did not have the legal force to impose 
contract amendments, but the highly regulated institutional environment, even with a regulator 
with no real power, made the company dependent on government.  As outlined by Oliver (1991, 
p.164), “organizations typically have interests they wish to protect or promote and dependence is 
rarely unidirectional”. The government acknowledged the limitation and adopted a negotiation 
approach on a voluntary basis. The CMEC could only be reduced with the EDP agreement. The 
renegotiation process restarted by the end of March 2012. EDP got involved in efforts to obtain 
some concessions from the government to safeguard the value of its long-term contracts for 
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energy generation. The compromise strategy reflected a partial compliance with institutional 
expectations on the EDP contribution to set the national electricity system on a sustainable path 
and to seem more socially accountable. For that purpose, EDP adopted a bargaining tactic. The 
company was open to negotiations with the government, but under certain conditions. One of 
them was the assurance that the value of CMEC would not be changed and there would instead 
be an extension of contracts.  
In May 2012, the Portuguese government announced a set of measures to reduce 
excessive rents and to address the sustainability of the national electricity system with the aim 
of saving EUR 1,800 million by 2020. EDP estimated that in global terms the economic and 
financial impact for EDP Group, once all the measures were in effect, corresponded to 1 per 
cent of EBITDA or 2.5 per cent of Earnings per Share per year (EDP, 2012b). It set an 
adjustment to the interest rate applicable to the tariff repercussion of the yearly fixed amount 
of the CMEC, without changing the value of contracts, which on average, for the period 2013 
to 2027, was EUR 13 million per year, corresponding to a present value of EUR 120 million 
(Decree-Law no. 32/2013 on February 26).11 
After the announcement of cost-reducing measures to ensure the sustainability of the 
electricity system, the issue of excessive rents was considered by EDP as to be closed. In a 
communication to the market on May 17th 2012, EDP announced that the new framework 
allowed “regulatory previsibility and stability in the Portuguese power sector, in the medium 
and long term”, which had “a significant importance for all the stakeholders of EDP” (EDP, 
2012b). The same message was reinforced by the CEO in several interviews, enhancing the 
positive effect of the forecasted increase in electricity tariffs on the sustainability of the 
Portuguese economy (e.g. Marcelino & Baldaia, 2012). In an exceptional period when all 
Portuguese were called to contribute with sacrifices, António Mexia replied that EDP had 
already done its share and the problem was solved, as follows: 
When the new shareholder, China Three Gorges, acquired a stake of the share capital of 
the company the reality regarding these rents was different. The Prime-Minister even said 
that the rules would not change after the sale. The fact is, they did change. Did the new 
shareholder feel defrauded with this change? The balance was achieved. That solution, in 
the case of EDP, translated into an effort that had not been forecasted. But everyone appreciates 
the fact that a question that had been open for a long time was resolved. (Marcelino & Baldaia, 
2012, p.9)  
 
EC pointed out that the important issue of containing the tariff debt through a reduction 
of excessive rents was not been adequately addressed, as the proposed elements for a solution 
                                                 
11  Regarding the policy costs embedded in CMEC, the government reduced the CMEC annuity discount rate from 
7.55 per cent to 4.72 per cent. 
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(mainly voluntary renegotiations and reduction in support schemes) appeared insufficient (EC, 
2012a). On the fourth review mission to Portugal the EC and the IMF asked for more 
determination “to push through reforms in areas that touched sensitive political and vested 
interests” (EC, 2012a, p.5). The announcements were not new, but they were significant due to 
the insistence with which they were repeated. But for the CEO the solution to the existing 
imbalances was “to reduce the weight of the state in the economy” and to channel resources “to 
the private sector, to the productive sector and to a more efficient and fair economy” (Macedo, 
2012, p.30).  
Criticism of the multiple constituents did not take long to appear as far as the limited 
impact on the sustainability of the national electricity system. ERSE emphasised the 
“insignificant expression of the renegotiation of the CMEC over-compensation” (ERSE, 2012, 
p.5). DECO alerted that the measures announced fell short of what was expected, “much due 
to the unavailability of electricity generating companies to waive a part of their revenues from 
indecorous contracts” (DECO, 2012, “Cutting the producers rents”, para.4). The media claimed 
that the reduction on the CMEC represented savings with a “less significant impact on 
household energy bills” (Prado, 2013a, p.11). The representatives of the Portuguese industry 
appealed for stronger action against the excessive rents in order to reduce the weight of CIEG 
in electricity tariffs (Teixeira, 2013). However, EDP remained resistant to any additional 
revision on the rate of return of its long-term production contracts.  
A company with a dimension such as that of EDP, with high profits achieved every year, 
should not or could not, contribute more to the effort that has been asked to all 
Portuguese? (…) EDP contributed with everything that was necessary for the sustainability 
of the electricity system ... (Sousa, 2013)  
 
(..). The negotiation was, moreover, an agreement with the government and it deserved 
international recognition from the point of view of the effort we would make, but this effort was 
also very voluntary… although EDP’s essential contribution is to invest... (V.Gonçalves, 2013) 
 
Annual reports reinforced that the management of the legal/regulatory agenda had been 
“a top priority for EDP” (EDP, 2014, p.46, emphasis in the original) and also considered the 
whole issue closed, drawing attention to the “proactive position” of the company by 
“contributing to solutions that aim the system’s sustainability”. After ten reviews of the EFAP, 
the rent-reducing measures implemented to eliminate the tariff debt by 2020 and to ensure the 
sustainability of the electricity system still appeared to be insufficient (EC, 2014). EDP 
continued to be blamed for benefiting from “rents created at the expense of end-users and the 
Portuguese economy” and remained heavily criticised (Campos & Gozblau, 2014, p.14). 
 
7. Discussion and conclusion  
33 
 
  Institutional complexity takes place against a background where competing demands 
arise in response to societal challenges (Raaijmakers et al., 2015). By acting mainly on market 
logic, EDP legitimacy was seriously questioned as a result of the public criticism that it made 
enormous profits at the expense of the Portuguese society and its dismissal in renegotiating 
contracts. The three packages created by the government to reduce costs associated with energy 
production, in accordance with the financial adjustment to which Portugal has been subject, 
accentuated the newsworthiness of the issue and influenced stakeholders’ perceptions about the 
power and influence of EDP in the defence of its contracts and support. Institutional pressures 
exerted on EDP with respect to the excessive rents issue to comply with cost-cutting measures 
in the electricity sector were highly salient, very broad-based, coercive, and intense. EDP was 
caught between the market logic demand to maximise profits to shareholders and returns to 
investors and the social obligation to reduce the electricity bill of consumers and to put the 
electricity system on a sustainable path. The evidence provided attests that the strategic 
responses chosen by EDP reflect institutional and technical pressures, as proposed by 
Greenwood et al. (2017). 
The media can be a suitable channel to disclose organisational messages to external 
stakeholders (Zavyalova et al., 2012). This study examined EDP’s strategic responses through 
the communications of its CEO in the media from 2010 to 2014. As a response to institutional 
pressures and expectations, EDP provided a public response through the media, as reported by 
prior studies (e.g., Beelitz & Merkl-Davies, 2012; Deephouse, 1996; Rindova et al., 2006), in 
what seemed to be an attempt to influence constituents concerning the greater legitimacy of its 
own claims. Considerations of power and interests in the relationship between EDP and its 
institutional environment are fundamental to understanding institutional pressures exerted on 
the company and the way the company responded to such conflict in institutional prescriptions. 
The organised interest groups, such as DECO and trade and industry associations, moved the 
issue onto the policy-making agenda to constrained political actors for legislative action. But 
evidence suggest that within this political-economic scenario, organisational action is directed 
toward maximising return on investment and shareholder primacy (Dillard et al., 2004). EDP 
adopted responses that were consistent with its internal goals of profitability, requested by 
important stakeholders – shareholders. The pressure brought to bear by the regulator and the 
organised interest groups to deliver cost reductions to be reflected in electricity prices put EDP 
at the heart of this issue, but gained strength with Troika intervention in terms of applying 
pressure. The EFAP precipitated new competing demands and intensified the existing ones.  
Despite its technical legitimacy, ERSE was not a powerful constituent. This regulator and the 
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organised interest groups did not possess the coercive power to force changes to limit the policy 
costs embedded in the electricity tariff. So only the combination of a particular group of 
stakeholders (Government, IFM and EC), in a given moment of time, had coercive influence 
over EDP regarding the issue of excessive rents. 
Consistent with Elsbach (1994), the denial strategy was adopted in regard to the main 
charges levelled against EDP. The company denial in response to those accusations was a 
rejection of the claims of most social constituents regarding the reduction of electricity bill costs 
and, therefore, it aroused widespread disapproval amongst Portuguese society, as noted in 
previous research findings (e.g., Lamin & Zaheer, 2012). With the exception of the 
acquiescence strategy, the remaining strategies of Oliver’s (1991) framework were observed, 
thus reinforcing Oliver’s argument that organisations may consider unconditional compliance 
unacceptable when competing demands are imposed on organisations. This study presents 
evidence that organisations are not passive agents when facing external constraints, and actively 
and consciously try to promote self-interest, thereby reinforcing the arguments of institutional 
theorists (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988; Goodstein, 1994; Oliver 1991).  
EDP did not want to give way on the profitability assured by its contracts, refusing to 
negotiate them and defying the legitimacy of the accusation that it benefited from excessive 
rents. Evidence suggests that this issue was exacerbated by very high pressures for profits due 
to reprivatisation. By proclaiming commitment to the profit logic, the company expected to 
gain credibility with its shareholders and investors, as suggested by the evidence presented in 
this study. These findings support the theoretical argument of Pache and Santos (2010) that 
organisational goals, as expressions of the system of values and references of organisational 
constituencies, are not easily negotiable.  
Our findings are consistent with prior studies that have shown that top management 
tends to symbolically demonstrate compliance with institutional norms and expectations and to 
engage in some form of window dressing or ritualism (e.g., Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008). In 
accordance with Criado-Jiménez et al.’s (2008) findings, the ritualism tactic was observed 
through arguments repeatedly used by the EDP CEO through several discourses, pointing out 
that the company had no negative impact on electricity bills, and deflecting constituents’ 
attention to most visible practices with the purpose of projecting social fitness.  
  It seems that the high level of institutional complexity lead to a large variety of responses 
and to delayed partial compliance to coercive pressures (Raaijmakers et al., 2015). The long 
delay in adopting the compromise strategy might signal that EDP wanted to maintain legitimacy 
with shareholders by showing them that it tried to fight the coercive force for as long as possible. 
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The EFAP became a source of institutional uncertainty and EDP has attempted to shape an 
organisational discourse, by adopting the compromise strategy, in order to reduce this 
uncertainty for shareholders and investors. It can be argued, as in Raaijmakers et al. (2015), 
that delaying partial compliance may be a strategic response in which the time is used as a 
resource for organisation actions, such as influencing the government or other constituents. It 
seems that EDP strategically resisted as it negotiated among competing forces of institutional 
control. As outlined by Oliver (1991), when facing conflicting demands, organisations’ 
interests may be served most effectively by obtaining an acceptable compromise between 
competing expectations. 
 The emphasis placed upon institutional features suggests that António Mexia intended 
to prove that EDP’s actions corresponded to normative and widely endorsed practices, as 
proposed by institutional theorists (e.g., Elsbach, 2004; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991), 
in an attempt to maintain EDP’s legitimacy.  We provide evidence that the CEO used subtle 
ways to introduce a positive bias, by selecting specific information items to externally legitimise 
corporate decisions and to protect vested interests, supporting Elsbach’s (1994) and Oliver’s 
(1991) theoretical arguments. Yet, accounting language is used to promote EDP’s interests and 
to influence stakeholders’ perceptions about corporate legitimacy, wherein elements of the 
institutional logic of “profitable business concern” (i.e., profits, efficiency, IRR, EBITDA) 
became part of the narrative. The CEO discourse articulated competing demands: efficiency 
and profitability associated with market pressures and shareholder demands along with broader 
stakeholder interests. In this vein, the words of the CEO were embedded within the broader 
neoliberal discourse. Such a view also finds support in theoretical arguments that accounting is 
a rhetorical device, the “language of capitalism”, that may serve to legitimise organisations and 
to perpetuate their status quo (Hopper & Powell, 1985, p.453; see also Morales et al., 2014).  
  In sum, media exposure affects companies who can use media to promote their own 
agendas. EDP dealt with conflicting prescriptions, facing uncertainty on how to maintain 
legitimacy. This may explain the change of strategic responses employed over time to cope 
with institutional demands in response to the strategic behaviour of the other actors. The 
evidence supports Goodstein’s (1994) argument that the content of institutional demands is a 
critical cause of organisations’ strategic responses. We also point to the country-level 
institutional structures, the organisations’ own characteristics and the power of the constituents 
involved in the issue as important predictors of responses in a complex environment. As 
observed by Zavyalova et al. (2012, p.1096), “managing the message” in the media of 
organisational behaviour and the subsequent stakeholders’ perceptions about the legitimacy of 
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its actions is an important part of an organisation’s strategy. However, the level of compliance 
with social expectations was not enough to please to most societal stakeholders. The perception 
that EDP did not contribute enough to ensure the sustainability of the national electricity 
system, nor sufficiently to the reductions in electricity bill prices continued to dominate the 
media agenda. 
This paper contributes to the literature by examining the way organisations respond to 
multiple constituents under institutional complexity through discourses (Bertels & Lawrence, 
2016; Raaijmakers et al., 2015; Vermeulen et al., 2016). The analysis of CEO’s verbal 
communications answers to calls by Merkl-Davis and Brennan (2017) and Nègre et al. (2017) 
in extending the authorship and forms of accounts beyond annual reports, hence adding more 
analytic richness to the accounting literature. While the content of formal reports has been 
extensively studied, there has been less research on ad hoc communications, such as CEO 
speeches (Tregidga et al., 2012). 
Additionally, this study proposes a methodological alternative to the positivist approach 
to study corporate communication through the messages of the CEO in the media. Responding 
to calls of several authors (Beattie & Davison, 2015; Tregidga et al., 2012), the research is a 
qualitative case study with an interpretive methodological perspective in order to expand the 
body of research seeking to understand the form and content of organisational responses to 
institutional pressures. It contributes also to diminishing the dearth of research on the “middle 
ground” strategies of compromise, avoidance and defiance (Lawrence & Buchanan, 2017, p. 
482).  Furthermore, the paper provides a new conceptual framework to help understanding 
organisational strategic responses to institutional pressures, and which can be tested and 
employed in future studies. By developing this framework, we have contributed to institutional 
theory by complementing Oliver’s (1991) strategic responses to institutional pressures with the 
use of verbal accounts as defined by Elsbach (1994). 
Finally, our findings contribute to critical accounting research on corporate 
communication by highlighting how corporate distinctive institutional traits enable 
organisations to engage in “interest-seeking, active organizational behavior” (Oliver, 1991, 
p.146) aimed at protecting vested interests and creating particular understandings which 
reinforce the dominance of capitalist/neoliberal logic. Furthermore, to date we have had limited 
insight concerning how companies in oligopolistic markets, taking into account their 
considerable economic power, respond to institutional constituents (Dhalla & Oliver, 2013). In 
particular, accountability to stakeholders is more important if the product is an essential 
commodity such as electricity (Hooks et al., 2002). The dependence we all have on access to 
37 
 
energy makes consumers vulnerable to the power of oligopoly and contributed to the transfer 
of wealth through the electricity sector. This strategy helped strengthen the neo-liberal regime 
of concentration of wealth. In this way, the electricity sector has become a device for 
transferring social wealth in which workers are plundered in favor of capital as taxpayers or 
consumers and see an increasing share of their income captured by privatised energy groups. 
Concluding, we bring supplementary evidence to the importance of questioning the public 
policy of privatisation of old state-owned monopolies. In this way, we have rendered visible 
the consequences of the project of neoliberalisation and the agenda of state privatisation of the 
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